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Abstract
This paper examines the UK's approach to balancing counter-terror laws
with human rights and civil liberties after 9/11. Since then, a litany of
legislation has been passed that some human rights commentators have
labeled as overzealous and draconian. Because of the glut of counter-
terror laws instituted, only a fraction of the provisions contained within
them will be reviewed including, indefinite detentions, stop and search
rights, passport seizures, and Temporary Exclusion Orders. The potential
for government abuse of far-reaching legislation is also highlighted
through a case study of Miranda v. the Secretary of State for the Home
Department and others. Part II analyzes how terrorism cases are dealt
with through the UK's judicial system, along with the UK's contentious
interaction with the European Court of Human Rights. The author finds
that, although the UK possesses a robust legislative process with many
checks and balances for countering the threat of terrorism, it should not
compromise its international and domestic legal obligations in its search
for security, or else risk losing its reputation as a model democracy, and
potentially isolate disaffected communities even further.
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Introduction 
The government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain has a long history of 
exercising its powers to counter terrorism, dating back to the 1700s when it 
would remove civil liberties such as the right to habeas corpus as a means of 
dealing with subversion.1  Targeted legislation aimed at ending terrorism 
would not come until much later in the form of the Prevention of Violence Act 
of 1938.  Although terrorism was not defined in this law, its primary purpose 
was to curb terrorist violence in Northern Ireland following threats from the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) of a wide reaching “terror offensive" across the 
United Kingdom.  The bill was hastened through parliament in less than a 
week, and gave police in Northern Ireland the power to stop and search 
without warrant, register terror suspects, and deny travel.2  This law would 
stay in existence until 1954, despite being introduced as a “temporary 
measure.”3  Two decades would pass until the United Kingdom would have a 
dedicated anti-terror law in the form of the Prevention of Terror Act of 1974 
(PTA 1974), which introduced the notion of proscribed organizations (groups 
designated by the government as terrorist organizations).4  The PTA 1974 also 
presented the first definition of terrorism that would form the basis for 
subsequent laws.  Part III (9.1) of the act describes terrorism as, “the use of 
violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of 
putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”5  This definition, 
although a narrower version of the description we see today, presented 
terrorism as solely politically motivated in order to counter the threat posed 
by the IRA.    
 
After the September 11 (9/11) attacks on the United States and the subsequent 
introduction of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, the 
United Kingdom hurriedly updated its recently introduced Terrorism Act 
2000 (TA 2000) to reflect the challenges and responsibilities presented by the 
new “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT).  Since 2001–especially following 
the 7 July (7/7) London bombings–a litany of anti-terror laws have been 
                                                 
1 Simon Bronitt, Andrew Brynes, and Miriam Gani, et al., "The United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat," Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ (May, 
2016): 331, available at: 
http://press.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s02.html. 
2 “1939 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act," Schedule 7, May 3, 2016, 
available at: http://www.schedule7.org.uk/history/1939-prevention-of-violence. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Bronitt, Brynes, and Gani, et al., “The United Kingdom Human Rights Act,” 332.  
5 Fionnuala McKenna, "Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974," CAIN, 
available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/pta1974.htm. 
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introduced that many human rights commentators have denounced as 
draconian and ill-balanced due to their wide-reaching capabilities and the 
potential for such laws to encroach on civil liberties, including the right to 
privacy and freedom of speech.  Due to the amount of legislation introduced, 
this article will only examine a fraction of the most controversial provisions 
contained within them, in order to discern whether or not U.K. anti-terror 
laws have substantially eroded civil liberties and human rights unnecessarily, 
or whether they have been proportionate with respect to countering the threat 
posed by terrorism.  
 
This article is divided into two parts.  Part I will cover counter-terror laws 
introduced since 2000, to include the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000), the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA), the Terrorism Act 
2006 (TA 2006), and the Counter Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 (CTSA 
2015).  The article will also examine some of the most controversial provisions 
within these laws, such as Section 44 and Schedule 7 stop and search powers, 
indefinite detention, freedom of speech concerns, passport seizures, and 
temporary exclusion orders (TEOs).  Furthermore, the potential for abuse of 
counter-terror laws by the government is explored by reviewing Miranda v. 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department and others.  Part II will look 
at the United Kingdom’s approach to dealing with terrorism cases in its 
domestic courts, and review the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) process, as well as the contentious interaction between the U.K. legal 
system and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to survey the 
challenges faced in balancing human rights with security needs.  The author 
finds that the United Kingdom has a highly accountable legal system with a 
vigorous set of anti-terror laws at its disposal.  Yet it must be mindful of 
encroaching on civil liberties and human rights to the point that anti-terror 
laws become counterproductive, and possibly, encourage homegrown 
terrorism even further.  When developing new legislation, the British 
Government must engage with the British Muslim community on a greater 
level than it has done in the past to ensure anti-terror laws do not 
unintentionally marginalize this minority population even further.  In 
addition to reforms of the SIACs, the United Kingdom must continue to 
uphold its international legal obligations.  Not only is this essential for 
protecting the integrity of the British legal system, but also to exhibit to the 
world that the United Kingdom will remain an exemplar democracy, 
regardless of the threat from terrorism.   
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Part I: Ramifications of Counter-Terrorism Laws 
The Terrorism Act 2000 and the Definition of Terrorism 
Legislators in the United Kingdom recognized that a new definition for 
terrorism was needed to reflect the modern terror threat facing the state and 
the public, and so amended the PTA 1974 definition in the TA 2000 Act to 
provide a wider reaching scope than before.6  As of 2001, terrorism is 
described as: 
 
“The use or threat of action [the key word action, as defined by Section 
1 (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, means to cause serious violence 
against a person, serious damage to property, endanger life, create a 
serious risk to the health and safety of the public or section of the 
public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt 
an electronic system] designed to influence the government or an 
international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or 
a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”7   
 
In addition to the expansion of the definition to include religious, racial, and 
ideological causes, the law also gave police forces a broad jurisdiction to fight 
terrorism, both domestically, and internationally.8   
 
Stop and Search Powers 
In the TA 2000 Act, stop and search powers were extended to geographical 
areas and could be used by law enforcement without suspicion.  Inciting 
terrorism through the proliferation of material and preaching hate is now a 
prosecutable offense, along with contributing or seeking training for use in 
terrorism. 9  However, it was Section 44 (stop and search rights) powers that 
generated discord due to the increase in racial profiling—one was between 
“five and seven times more likely to be stopped” if black or of Asian 
ethnicity—and added to the public perception that police would abuse their 
                                                 
6 “Q and A: Anti-Terrorism Legislation," BBC News, October 17, 2003, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3197394.stm. 
7 The Terrorism Act 2000, 2000 c. 11, Section 1, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1#section-1-1-b. 
8 BBC News, “Q and A.” 
9 Ibid. 
 
Honeywood: Counter-Terrorism Laws and Human Rights
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
 31 
 
powers.10  Nevertheless, given the propensity for terrorists to hide and lay 
dormant among the population, and their flexibility in delaying and bringing 
forth attacks, law enforcement personnel are at a distinct disadvantage when 
countering terrorists, in comparison to “ordinary criminals” as Lord Carlile of 
Berrie, Queen’s Council (QC) points out in his report to parliament.11   
 
Examining the stop and search statistics further highlights the difficulty 
police forces face.  According to the Home Office, males have committed 92% 
of terrorism-related offenses, of which Asian males have made up a large 
proportion of those arrested. 12  The figures also show that 76% of those 
arrested identify as British, which not only shows the pervasiveness of 
homegrown terrorism, but also the challenge presented to police officers in 
identifying terror suspects.13  The ability for police to stop and search suspects 
in troubled areas is vital given the figures and evidence.  Section 44 rights 
may be inconvenient to the public, but as Lord Carlile contends, given the 
unpredictable nature of terrorism, “the powers are necessary and very useful 
in the investigation, early disruption and detection of terrorism.”14 
 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
Indefinite Detention 
Following 9/11, the U.K. government passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and 
Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) two months after the second reading that would 
not only change and add to what types of attacks constitute terrorism, but 
would also introduce an unprecedented set of laws that would encroach on 
civil liberties and basic human rights.15  The most conspicuous of these was 
                                                 
10 "Section 44 Terrorism Act," Liberty, available at: https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/human-rights/justice-and-fair-trials/stop-and-search/section-44-
terrorism-act. 
11 Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., “The Definition of Terrorism,” March, 2007: 23, available 
at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228
856/7052.pdf 24 27. 
12 “Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update to 31 December 2014,” The 
Home Office, June, 2015, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-
terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powers-
under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-
and-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Lord Carlile, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 28. 
15 "A-Z of Legislation: Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001," The Guardian 
(January 19, 2009) available at: 
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the “indefinite detention without charge or trial of foreign nationals” 
provision (repealed in 2006).16  This provision was reserved for foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorism or having terrorist links who could not be 
deported to their country of origin.  The debated law was not only deemed 
discriminatory, but was also recognized to have contravened two parts of the 
Human Rights Act of 1998,17 yet, was passed based on Article 15 derogation 
rights.  The two articles in question were Article 5 (the right to liberty and 
security) and Article 6 (the right to a fair trial) which state:  
 
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge 
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall 
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending 
trial.”18 
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”19 
 
The shock of 9/11 and the realization of the threat that terrorism posed to 
Western society led to the institution of legislation that, while intrusive, was 
deemed necessary by policymakers as the gravity of the threats being faced 
were ascertained.  Consequently, the speed at which the ATCSA 2001 bill was 
passed did come under some critique from the Home Affairs Committee, 
which declared: 
 
“We question whether it is appropriate for this Bill to be passed 
through the House of Commons in exactly two weeks with only three 
days of debate on the floor of the House. A Bill of this length - 125 
clauses and eight schedules covering 114 pages - with major 
implications for civil liberties should not be passed by the House in 
                                                 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/13/anti-
terrorism-act. 
16 Ibid.; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 2001 c. 24, Part 4, Section 33, 
available at:  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/section/33. 
17 “A-Z of Legislation.” 
18 “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” Articles 
5, 6, & 15, European Convention on Human Rights, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 
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such a short period and with so little time for detailed examination in 
committee.”20 
 
The rapid passage of the bill shortened the time necessary for a thorough 
examination of the new legislation, and continued the trend for reactive 
counter-terror laws, but more concerning were the provisions that resulted in 
derogations from international treaties like the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).  Furthermore, it was noted that the bill seemed to place the rights of 
British citizens above that of foreign nationals, with John Wadham, the 
director of the human rights organization Liberty, exclaiming: 
  
“What seems to be being suggested by the Government and in this Bill 
is that we can somehow avoid the usual presumption of innocence 
which will apply to British citizens and that because these people are 
foreigners we can lock them up for indefinite periods.”21   
 
Though the practice was unfair, the unique situation surrounding some of 
these detainees and the questionable interrogation techniques practiced by 
many of the detainees’ countries of origin meant that many of them could not 
be deported.  Furthermore, the government could not be assured that terror 
suspects would be prevented from “fighting another day” if expatriated. 
Meanwhile, the seriousness of the potential for harm to the general public 
from their release–detainees were declared a national security risk since 
British security services could not guarantee they would be able to monitor 
them sufficiently–meant that the detention of these potentially dangerous 
persons was the only viable option.22  Prudently, the law did include sunset 
provisions that would require renewal after 15 months, and then annually 
thereafter.  In the meantime, Special Immigration Appeals Commissions were 
made available to detainees to hear cases that could not be processed through 
the civil courts for national security reasons.23 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 “Parliamentary Consideration of Terrorism Legislation,” The House of Commons, 
November 15, 2001, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhaff/351/35102.ht
m. 
21 Ibid., 25. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 34. 
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The Terrorism Act of 2006 
Freedom of Speech Concerns: The Glorification of Terror 
The Terrorism Act of 2006 (TA 2006) was introduced following the 7/7 
London bombings and amended the TA 2000 Act.  New offenses were 
introduced such as inciting or encouraging terrorism, the possession of 
terrorist publications, and the glorification of terrorism. The bill asserts: 
 
“…statements that are likely to be understood by members of the 
public as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of 
acts of terrorism or Convention offences include every statement 
which glorifies [“glorification”, according to TA 2006, includes any 
form of praise or celebration, and cognate expressions are to be 
construed accordingly] the commission or preparation (whether in 
the past, in the future or generally) of such acts; and is matter from 
which that person could reasonably be expected to infer that what 
is being glorified  is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by him in existing circumstances…”24 
 
With the TA 2000 Act, any person found to have directly or indirectly, by 
oral/written inferences or statements, encouraged the commission of terrorist 
acts, or glorified previous acts, is liable to criminal charges.  Additionally, 
anyone found to have disseminated/created terrorist publications, trained or 
obtained the skills necessary for terrorist acts, could also be indicted under 
the bill.  Most notably, this bill also applies electronically, in order to include 
offenses conducted by persons on social media.25 
 
Organizations like the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) decried 
the law as being ill thought out averring that the vagueness of the language 
coupled with the outlawing of speech of this kind was contrary to democratic 
ideals, and that limiting speech “threatens to make careless talk a crime.”26  
The limiting of such speech is understandable given the need to avert social 
unrest and prevent the radicalization of vulnerable sections of society.  
                                                 
24 Terrorism Act 2006, 2006 c. 11., Part 1, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/part/1. 
25 Ibid. 
26 "Free Speech and Protest," National Council for Civil Liberties, available at: 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/free-speech-and-protest. 
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However, lawmakers should consider the wider implications of limiting 
speech on democracy, and its effect on extreme groups that may go 
underground.  Furthermore, limiting speech threatens academia and 
collegiality between students at educational institutions across the land who 
may become fearful of being misinterpreted, or worse still, being brought up 
on terror charges.27  Critics of the legislation also declared that those 
defending freedom fighters across the world could be implicated under the 
new law, with some citing Nelson Mandela’s fight against apartheid as an 
example of a just cause that would be outlawed under the new regulation.28  
Despite this valid point, it would later be harder to justify post 9/11 because of 
the common consensus concerning terrorism as aberrant to international 
standards following UN Resolution 1373–not to mention the difficulty in 
justifying the criteria for who constitutes a freedom fighter, and who does 
not.29 
 
Miranda v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others 
The wide scope of anti-terrorism laws and the restriction on certain freedoms 
from their institution raises the question if they are too far-reaching and 
vulnerable to abuse by the authorities.  An often-cited example of this is the 
perceived encroachment on journalistic rights.  In 2013, two Guardian 
newspaper employees, David Miranda and Glenn Greenwald, were covering 
the Edward Snowden leaks.  Miranda (Mr. Greenwald’s assistant), travelling 
to Rio de Janeiro from London, Heathrow, and carrying 58,000 classified 
files on an encrypted hard drive obtained from Snowden was detained at 
Heathrow airport under the T2000 Act, Schedule 7, for the maximum nine 
hours allowed by the law.30   
 
In Miranda v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department and others, 
the court considered three questions.  Firstly, if the use of Schedule 7 to 
apprehend Miranda was appropriate given the provision’s intended use as an 
anti-terrorism apparatus; secondly, if law enforcement personnel carried out 
Schedule 7 in a proportionate manner; and thirdly, whether the seizure of the 
                                                 
27 Simon Jeffery, "Q&A: The Glorification of Terrorism," The Guardian (February 15, 
2006) available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/15/qanda.terrorism. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Lord Carlile, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 44. 
30 Owen Bowcott, "David Miranda Allowed to Appeal Against Ruling on Heathrow 
Detentio," The Guardian (May 15, 2014) available at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/david-miranda-appeal-high-court-
ruling-detention-heathrow. 
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files constituted a violation of the right to free expression under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 31  The court found that the officer who carried 
out the Schedule 7 procedure was justified to stop Miranda, regardless of the 
prompt from security services, with the judge pronouncing: 
 
“As I have noted, the proper exercise of the Schedule 7 power does not 
require that the examining officer have any grounds whatever “for 
suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1) (b) (Schedule 7 
paragraph 2(4)); and the Schedule 7 purpose is not to determine 
whether the subject is, but only whether he “appears to be” a 
terrorist.”32 
 
The court also discussed the checks and balances in place to prevent the abuse 
of Schedule 7 procedures by law enforcement like the “good faith” of the 
officer, the authority to stop based on the definition of terrorism under TA 
2000 Section 1. 9(c), the sanctioned use of Schedule 7 at ports of entry, and 
the time limitation of 9 hours. 33  
 
The second point the court considered was whether the use of counter-terror 
laws were permissible in order to retrieve stolen government data, which the 
court found was in the U.K. government’s authority to do.  Witnesses from the 
security services stated that preventing political embarrassment was not the 
purpose of the stop. They averred that the nation’s security was at stake, not 
only because of the potential leak of new email intercept technology, but also 
because the lives of security officers and members of the public were at risk if 
the files Miranda was carrying were released.  In the eyes of the security 
services, the Schedule 7 stop would have been the only way to retrieve the files 
in Miranda’s possession. 34 
 
The broadness of the definition of terrorism in the TA 2000 Act was also 
brought into question by Miranda, only for the judges to confirm that the 
definition was intentionally broad, asserting, “For the reasons given by Lord 
Lloyd, Lord Carlile and Mr. Anderson, the definition of ‘terrorism’ was indeed 
intended to be very wide.”35  The court also addressed claims by the defendant 
                                                 
31 Mr Justice Ouseley, Mr Justice Openshaw, “Judgment: R (Miranda) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department” High Court of Justice (2014): 2-34, available at: 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/miranda-v-sofshd.pdf. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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that the seizure of the files inhibited the freedom of the press and encroached 
on the public interest because, in its opinion, the national interest outweighed 
that right.  The court also recognized that Miranda was not a journalist per se 
in its statement: 
 
“The claimant was not a journalist; the stolen GCHQ intelligence 
material he was carrying was not ‘journalistic material,’ or if it was, 
only in the weakest sense. But he was acting in support of Mr 
Greenwald’s activities as a journalist. I accept that the Schedule 7 stop 
constituted an indirect interference with press freedom, though no 
such interference was asserted by the claimant at the time. In my 
judgment, however, it is shown by compelling evidence to have been 
justified.”36 
 
The court also reviewed the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 
10) argument and found that, under English law, Schedule 7 rights did not 
overstep its bounds, reminding the court that “the executive never enjoys 
unfettered power,”37 as accountability and transparency are found throughout 
the legal process by way of independent review.38  Miranda’s claim that 
Schedule 7 violated his privacy and his journalistic rights was rebutted with 
the defense citing previous cases like Beghal v. the Department of Public 
Prosecutions39 that held that Schedule 7 was not in violation of human rights 
and that the European Convention on Human Rights/European Court of 
Human Rights did not support unconditional journalistic rights.40 
 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
Most recently, the United Kingdom passed the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act of 2015 that received Royal Assent (in Britain, Royal Assent 
formally turns a proposed bill into a law) three months after its first reading.41  
It contained new provisions intended to aid law enforcement in countering 
suspected terrorists including a faster process for the seizure of passports, 
and the introduction of Temporary Exclusion Orders.42  
 
                                                 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, c. 6, available at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/counterterrorismandsecurity.html. 
42 Ibid. 
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Power to Seize Travel Documents 
The U.K. government can now seize the passports of U.K. or non-U.K. 
nationals of any age who are suspected of travelling in support of terrorism 
overseas for up to 30 days.  Previous legislation put law enforcement at a 
disadvantage as obtaining the authority to seize travel documents through the 
court system could often be lengthy and require Home Secretary approval.43  
Recent figures released from Europol show that 3000-5000 fighters from 
Europe are suspected to have travelled to and from Syria in 2014, and 500 of 
those have been from the United Kingdom, underscoring the need to take 
measures to counter the flow of European fighters to the so-called Islamic 
State (IS).”4445  The new powers mean that the delay provides sufficient time 
for officers to conduct investigations relating to the suspect.46  But, as with 
most counterterrorism laws, the wording used to justify using this new 
authority is vague.  According to the Home Office:  
 
“The threshold for exercising the power is that the police officer has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is at the port with the 
intention of leaving Great Britain or the United Kingdom for the 
purpose of involvement in terrorism related activity outside the United 
Kingdom.”47 
  
Meanwhile, power to stop travelers comes “as a result of intelligence or on the 
basis of observation or information obtained at port,”48 raising fears that 
racial profiling will again become an issue since the likelihood of being 
stopped if of Asian ethnicity is “between 1.5 and 2.5 times the rate for White 
people.”49  Nonetheless, checks and balances have been built into the bill to 
                                                 
43 Matthew Holehouse, "Counter-terrorism Bill: What It Contains," The Telegraph 
(November 26, 2014) available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11254950/Counter-
terrorism-Bill-What-it-contains.html. 
44 “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015,” Europol (2015): 22, 
available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-
situation-and-trend-report-2015. 
45 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, The 
Home Office (December 3, 2014) available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382
245/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_2_-_Passport_Seizure.pdf 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Isabella Sankey, “Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Bill in the House of Lords,” Liberty (January, 2015): 5, available at: 
https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty's%20Briefing%20on%20the%20Counter-
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prevent the arbitrary use of seizure powers.  For instance, officers are 
required to seek permission from senior officers before conducting a stop 
(senior officers themselves are also inspected), and will have their stops 
reviewed after 72-hours.  A code of conduct has also been introduced for 
border officers.50  Liberty has also made the government aware that children 
and foreign nationals may be at particular hardship financially if suspicions 
are proven wrong.  The resulting disruption to travel and the knock-on effects 
to one’s private life could be detrimental to one’s wellbeing and safety.51  On 
balance, the passport seizure provisions seem necessary given the flow of 
naturalized U.K. citizens travelling for the purposes of terrorism.  For 
example, naturalized citizen Mohammed Emwazi–nicknamed “Jihadi John” 
by the press–hailed from West London and travelled to Kuwait and Tanzania 
before eventually travelling to Syria to join IS–despite being monitored by 
MI5 for five years before joining.52  Although it was a failing by the security 
services, having the ability to have disrupted his travel plans by restricting his 
movement through seizure of travel documents not only could have prevented 
the further radicalization of this person, and prevented the deaths of Western 
journalists, it could have also sent a strong message to others contemplating 
similar actions.53 
 
Temporary Exclusion Orders 
Lastly, Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) authorize the government to 
prevent anyone suspected of engaging in terrorism from returning to the 
United Kingdom for a period of up to two years, and are renewable.54  This 
provision targets British citizens (provisions were previously reserved for 
those with dual nationality or naturalized citizens in order to avoid rendering 
the individual stateless–an act that is illegal under international law) who 
were previously impervious to efforts from the government to exclude them 
from returning following travel for the purpose of terrorism.55  Besides 
sidestepping the issue of statelessness, another notable gap in this provision 
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is that anyone issued a TEO because of “travel for the purpose of terrorism” 
may be vulnerable to questionable treatment by the country to which the 
person is exiled. Countries battling insurgencies and terrorism such as 
Nigeria, Kenya, and Turkey have security services that are known to practice 
harsh interrogation techniques; thus, the person on the receiving end of the 
TEO, having been identified to non-U.K. authorities, is at risk of abuse by the 
security services of their host nation.56  
 
Although one might suggest that a person losing the right to return to the 
United Kingdom after engaging in such acts (not to mention the threat posed 
by their return) justifies the denial of entry on the surface; in reality, TEOs 
can complicate matters further.  For example, TEOs put the United Kingdom 
at risk of further violating its obligations under international law by 
contravening the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.57  Notwithstanding a potential breach of international law and 
the disregard for a person’s freedom to travel, the TEO effectively puts the 
onus of handling suspects onto another, possibly less capable country that 
could simply release the exiled individual and allow him or her to “fight” 
another day.  Moreover, blocking an individual’s return limits the ability of 
U.K. intelligence services to monitor terror suspects for any terror-related 
activity by placing that individual out of reach.58   
 
This section reviewed major anti-terror legislation, beginning with the 
Prevention of Violence Act of 1934, and noted the evolution of the definition 
of terrorism, from its original focus on politically motivated acts, to 
encompassing religious and ideological drivers as seen in the TA 2000 Act. 
The fast-pace at which subsequent laws were passed in reaction to terrorist 
threats was also examined, underscoring the flexibility of the U.K. legal 
system.  However, the swift passage of legislation like the Indefinite Detention 
provisions in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, due to the 
urgency of the terror threat, resulted in the passing of overzealous legislation 
in some instances.  The United Kingdom has shown its commitment to UN 
resolution 1373 through its implementation of strong anti-terror laws and 
support of the U.S. “global war on terror.”  Yet it differs from the United 
States in how it processes terror suspects.  Unlike the U.S. legal system that 
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processes the majority of terror suspects using military tribunals at 
Guantanamo Bay, the United Kingdom uses its domestic courts to process 
terror suspects through the Special Immigration Appeals Commissions 
(SIAC).  Part II examines the SIAC process and surveys the U.K. judicial 
system’s interaction with the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Part II: UK domestic courts and terrorism & the European 
Courts of Human Rights 
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
In the 1970s, cases dealing with terrorism relating to the “Troubles” in 
Northern Ireland were held in “Diplock Courts,” named after Lord Diplock, 
who first recommended that trials of terror suspects should take place 
without juries to prevent the possibility of jury interference and 
intimidation.59  Today, domestic courts process most terror related cases.  
However, in sensitive situations where national security concerns arise, the 
United Kingdom may elect to use the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) process.  Established in 1997, the court convenes “behind 
closed doors” and allows the government to hold hearings in a secure 
environment.  Within the court, Closed Material Procedures (CMPs) provide 
judges access to secret evidence (evidence sourced from foreign intelligence 
services, police, and informants) that is withheld from the defendant and the 
public.  Once closed materials are released to the judge and the Special 
Advocate (a defense lawyer), the Special Advocate’s communication with his 
client is limited in time and as to the information that can be shared.60 
 
The court serves a purpose in guarding information that cannot be shared in a 
civil court because of the potential detrimental effects that such a release 
would have on national security.  Still, the secretiveness of the court does 
raise questions on its fairness.  For instance, a recent Amnesty International 
report on SIACs noted that many Special Advocates complained of difficulties 
conducting their duties under CMPs.  The ability to cross-examine expert 
witnesses and the accused is severely hampered, as is the ability to challenge 
any evidence that could be contested.  Dinah Rose QC provided Amnesty 
                                                 
59 Roach, Kent, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
60 “Left in the Dark: The Use of Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom,” Amnesty 
International Publications (October 15, 2012): 7, available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR45/014/2012/en/. 
 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1546
 42 
 
International an excellent example of the type of situation faced by Special 
Advocates:61  
 
“Suppose an allegation is made that a particular individual attended a 
training camp in Afghanistan – this is a SIAC-type example – on a 
particular date, was seen there, and there is identification evidence 
that describes the individual as having a beard. If you are the special 
advocate, you cannot take instructions to find out whether the 
claimant had a beard at that date or whether he might have in his 
possession any photograph of himself taken at that date showing he 
did not have a beard.”62 
 
It is understandable that courts should convene in this way when evidence 
made public could threaten the safety of officers or disrupt counter-terrorism 
operations.  Yet the secrecy surrounding the court begs the question: Is it 
worth holding a court at all if it is unbalanced and in favor of the government?  
The cycle continues with final judgements wherein, depending on whether a 
closed or open judgement is granted, the defendant may only be given a brief 
reason for why a case was lost, making the appeal process extremely 
frustrating.63 
 
Reform to overzealous legislation has taken place.  For example, indefinite 
detentions from the ATCSA 2001 were repealed and reconstituted over time 
into the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM), which lets 
police monitor suspects while limiting their movement.64  However, reform to 
SIACs and the hearing of secret evidence has been slow coming.  Not only is 
the United Kingdom omitting its responsibilities to provide fairness in its 
courts, but it should also be mindful of violating international conventions 
like Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) that grant individuals the right to a fair trial.65  Interestingly, the use 
of CMPs has moved beyond SIACs and now happens regularly in civil courts 
after the passing of the Justice and Security Act of 2013 (JSA 2013).  Though 
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not a new concept, expanding into civil courts does emphasize the potential 
for “creep” to happen when CMPs become the norm.66   
 
The U.K. government cites that the implementation of the JSA 2013 is 
required to protect intelligence shared by the United States, and that failing to 
secure information in courts may result in a loss of confidence by the United 
States and thus the potential end to the information sharing relationship.67  
Despite the ominous sentiment surrounding CMP’s, a favorable aspect of 
extending CMPs into civil courts is that many cases that are currently stalled 
for the purposes of national security can now be heard–albeit in secret–
allowing justice to run its course.68  At the same time, human rights 
proponents aver that CMPs are contrary to Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights–the right to a fair trial.  Yet, on closer 
examination, this right is not guaranteed by the article which states, 
“Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society.”69  Amnesty International also 
argues that the disclosure of certain evidence through CMPs rather than the 
previous method of using Public Interest Immunity (PII) procedures–which 
completely excluded information from both sides–does not provide “effective 
remedy,” since material is excluded from the individual concerned–a valid 
point.70  Nevertheless, transparency and open justice must be balanced in the 
interest of security.  To ensure the integrity of the system, judicial reviews 
through parliament do take place, while intelligence commissions provide a 
robust mechanism to monitor security services for any abuses of power.71  The 
ultimate fail safe however is found through the independence of the judiciary, 
which is protected from interference under law to ensure that national 
security is not used as a ruse to achieve political or nefarious ends.  
 
The European Courts of Human Rights & terror cases 
Human rights and security have been hard to balance with today’s terrorist threat, 
which is one of the reasons the current U.K. government has publicly stated that it 
wishes to amend the European Convention on Human Rights that was adopted 
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into British domestic law under the Human Rights Act of 1998.72  Several cases 
concerning the extradition or deportation of convicted terrorists have seen British 
court rulings blocked from proceeding for violating human rights by the European 
Court of Human Rights.  One case that stands out is that of Abu Hamza, which 
originally led to the current discourse.  Abu Hamza, an Egyptian-born cleric, was 
notorious for his support of al-Qaida, and the radical preaches he would give 
outside of the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London.  British security services 
monitored his activity for years due to his suspected links to terrorism.  He was 
eventually arrested and jailed in 2006 for seven years on 11 charges under the TA 
2000, including incitement to commit murder and racial hatred.  However, it 
would be his bid to stop his extradition to the United States for his part in the 
kidnapping of four tourists in Yemen in 1998, and his alleged plans to establish a 
terrorist training camp in Oregon, that would cause a media frenzy.73  To stop the 
extradition, Abu Hamza–along with five others on separate terror charges–
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights.  Babar Ahmad and others v. 
the United Kingdom argued against extradition on the grounds that their Article 3 
human rights would be infringed upon if extradited to the United States, because 
of U.S. deviations from international norms concerning torture, and the length of 
time they would have to serve in a U.S. “supermax” jail.74   
 
Though this is but one example, the British government and certain media 
outlets continue to push the narrative that the United Kingdom’s ability to 
counter terrorism is stunted by the Strasbourg court which is why the former 
Home Secretary and now Prime Minister, Theresa May, called for Britain to 
withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights.75  Hamza’s court 
battle lasted eight years and cost tax payers over a million pounds, while the 
European Court of Human Rights deliberated on whether extradition to the 
United States would or would not encroach on Hamza’s human rights.76 The 
portrayal of this case in the media, and the tendency for media outlets to 
focus on extraordinary cases like this one, has garnered within the public the 
idea that these types of disputes between the United Kingdom and the 
European Court over criminals are commonplace—this is simply not the case.  
                                                 
72 “The UK Government’s Proposals Regarding the Human Rights Act and the European 
Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2015, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/20/uk-governments-proposals-regarding-
human-rights-act-and-european-court-human-rights. 
73 “Babar Ahmad and Abu Hamza Among Terror Suspects to be Sent to US,” BBC News 
(October 5, 2012) available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-17662054. 
74 Ibid.   
75 Human Rights Watch, “The UK Government’s Proposals,”; “UK must leave European 
Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa May,” The Guardian (April 25, 2016) 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-
european-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum. 
76 “How Abu Hamza Came to Court in New York,” BBC News (April 14, 2014), available 
at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26737888. 
 
Honeywood: Counter-Terrorism Laws and Human Rights
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
 45 
 
For instance, of the “1,243 cases that were brought before the European court 
in 2014, only four cases were lost by the U.K. government,” underlining the 
misconception.77   The European Court of Human Rights may be an 
inconvenience to the United Kingdom, but the European Court’s ability to 
challenge U.K. court decisions provides essential accountability and much 
needed balance to the ongoing debate between security and human rights.   
 
Conclusion 
Strong anti-terror legislation remains a valuable tool in countering terrorism, 
and the United Kingdom should continue to pass laws to meet that threat.  
Concurrently, the United Kingdom should continue to fine-tune existing laws 
that encroach on human rights and liberties beyond a reasonable point, and it 
could achieve this by integrating civil society into the legal process.  It is clear 
that Special Advocates face barriers in effectively carrying out their roles, and 
more can be done to ensure the impartiality of SIACs.  Aside from working 
with civil liberty organizations, the SIAC ought to consider using an 
independent adjudicator or judge (with the appropriate security clearances) 
to assess whether closed material procedures are being employed 
appropriately and fairly in any given trial.  Although this does not address the 
unbalanced nature of the court in that defendants are still not privy to all the 
evidence, having independent adjudication would help ensure a fairer trial 
and be another step toward reaching the goal of open justice.   
 
Another issue brought to the fore by the United Kingdom’s far-reaching 
counterterrorism legislation is the perception from members of the Muslim 
community that such laws normalize racial profiling, and ultimately 
encourage the growth of terrorism by isolating the community even further. It 
could be said that it is not just the legality of these laws that matter for 
national security, but the perception of them and their implementation. One 
group in particular, the Muslim Council of Great Britain, who claim to be the 
largest Muslim umbrella organization in Britain today, have been most vocal 
in expressing their opinion on counter-terror legislation. However, their 
often-hardline standpoint on U.K foreign policy and social issues has meant 
that the Conservative Party has distanced themselves from the organization 
and has been unwilling to work with the them in countering terrorism.78 
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Although the MCB condemns terror attacks,79 elements within the MCB have 
taken an extremely controversial stance in the past on social issues, from the 
boycotting of holocaust memorials to taking an ultra-conservative view on 
LGBTQ rights,80 which run contrary to British secular ideals.  They have 
stated their disapproval at the “glorification of terror” provision that was 
passed in 2006, declaring, “the circumscription of dissenting opinion through 
the banning of non-violent groups and the implications for expressing 
legitimate criticism and condemnation of oppressive regimes and those who 
violate international legality.”81 There are clear ideological differences 
between members of the British Government and the MCB on how to tackle 
terrorism, but closing all dialogue and marginalizing such a large bloc of 
Muslim society may be detrimental in the long-run.  Regardless of the 
conservative leanings within the MCB, the MCB’s wide-reach within the 
Muslim community means that it could be a useful ally in fighting 
radicalization, and help the government develop policies to better integrate 
British Muslims into British society. 
 
Trust and confidence in law-enforcement among Muslim families is also 
lacking; suggesting that gaining their support for government counter-terror 
efforts will be increasingly difficult unless relations with the police are 
improved.82 One way to regain the trust of disaffected communities would be 
to increase minority numbers within the police force that currently lacks 
diversity within their ranks; this may help émigré communities identify with 
police better and encourage greater collaboration in the fight against terror. 
Presently, police officers of Muslim faith are not recorded in government 
statistics.  However, as of 2015, only 5.5% of the police force was recorded as 
being members of an ethnic minority, showing that more work needs to be 
done in terms of police recruitment.  The government should address this 
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issue by working with community outreach initiatives to deliberate on how to 
encourage young Muslims to pursue a career in the police force, and then 
allocate an appropriate amount of funding for a targeted recruiting campaign 
within the Muslim community.  
 
The British vote to leave the EU also brings into question the wider 
implication of Brexit on security. In the weeks following the vote, it seems the 
far right has been emboldened: Statistics show a 20% spike in racially 
motivated hate crimes against visible minorities according to the British 
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC).83  It is extremely important at this 
time that law enforcement agencies show a zero-tolerance approach to 
perpetrators of hate crimes to prevent the normalization of racist sentiment, 
and to prevent a further decline in relations with émigré communities. Long-
term, the security relationship with the EU post-Brexit remains to be seen, 
but the impact should be limited given the necessity of state cooperation in 
defeating terrorism.  So far, Britain has not announced any plans to stop 
using EU security databases, or to severe ties with Europol.  In fact, the 
strengthening of cooperation between European states seems more likely 
given the recent surge in terror attacks across Europe:  The appointment of 
the British Ambassador to France, Sir Julian King, as the new EU security 
commissioner hints at Europe’s intent to maintain close security ties.84   
 
The appointment of former Home Secretary, Theresa May, to the position of 
Prime Minister, means that previous calls by her to withdraw from the 
European Court of Human Rights, and for the creation of a British Bill of 
Rights may come to fruition given her new mandate.  This would be a 
mistake.  Derogations from the ICCPR, the UN Convention against Torture, 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, in the hope of securing 
Britain against terrorist activity, will hurt British standing in the world by 
damaging its reputation as a model of legislative integrity and human rights 
champion.  By such action, it will no longer be able to distinguish itself from 
that of the authoritarians it claims are anathema to democracy.  Leaving the 
European Court—which is a separate entity from the European Union—would 
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put the United Kingdom akin to authoritarian Belarus85 in terms of countries 
that are not signatories, and would result in the U.K. legislative system losing 
a critical redoubt of accountability.  The Conservative Party has suggested a 
British Bill of Rights, but fears that it may be a watered down version of the 
current Human Rights Act are warranted, given the worldwide trend towards 
curbing freedoms in the name of security.86  The Human Rights Act of 1998 
codified freedom of speech, which had only been assumed under British 
common law, now guarantees the British people access to basic rights.  
Replacing this law would ultimately negate the rights of the majority in order 
to deal with a problematic few in the search for greater security.   
 
The United Kingdom—much like other developed democracies—faces an 
uphill struggle balancing human rights and civil liberties with an ever-
changing security environment.  The rise in homegrown extremism, the 
ability for homegrown terrorists to travel freely throughout the European 
Union, and the flexibility of terrorist operations means that law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies have an extremely difficult job in anticipating and 
stopping terrorist attacks.  The legislative process across the world has 
traditionally been slow in managing the rise of non-state actors and keeping 
pace with changes in technology, but the United Kingdom has shown the 
robust nature of its legal system when it comes to passing anti-terror 
legislation.  However, to ensure anti-terror laws do not foment extremism, it 
is essential that the government engage with the Muslim community during 
the policymaking process to prevent further alienation.  Some of the laws 
detailed in this article have been overzealous and have compromised liberties 
and human rights at times to protect the public, but, on balance, have been 
necessary to counter terrorist actors.  When laws have overstepped their 
bounds, constant oversight, the inclusion of periodic reviews, and sunset 
clauses have placed draconian laws firmly into check. 
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